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Abstract This paper examines the points of disagreement between Neo-Darwinian
and recent Neo-Aristotelian discussions of the status of purposive language in
biology. I discuss recent Neo-Darwinian ‘‘evolutionary’’ treatments and distinguish
three ways to deal with the philosophical status of teleological language of purpose:
teleological error theory, methodological teleology, and Darwinian teleological
realism. I then show how ‘‘non-evolutionary’’ Neo-Aristotelian approaches in the
work of Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot differ from these by offering a view
of purposiveness grounded in life-cycle patterns, rather than in long-term evolu-
tionary processes or natural selection. Finally, I argue that the crucial difference
between Neo-Darwinian and Neo-Aristotelian approaches regards the question of
whether or not reproduction deserves the status of an ‘‘ultimate’’ aim of organisms. I
offer reasons to reject the concept of an ‘‘ultimate’’ aim in evolutionary biology and
to reject the notion that reproduction serves a purpose. I argue that evolutionary
biology is not in the position to determine what the ‘‘ultimate’’ explanation of
natural purpose is.
Keywords Teleology  Neo-Darwinism  Neo-Aristotelianism  Purpose of
reproduction  Ultimate causation
1 Introduction
Why do birds migrate? The obvious answer to this question might appear to be that
they do so in order to find food, a more favorable habitat, and favorable weather
conditions that will allow them to survive and satisfy their needs. Yet this answer
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appears to many objectionable, or at least requiring serious technical qualification,
because it implies a kind of goal or purpose that a bird has when it acts, and, more
importantly, that this goal both describes and explains its behavior. Descriptions that
impute goal-directedness to activities and processes in nature are called teleological
and the question of whether, and in what sense, this language of function and
purpose can be valid in the study of life and its evolution is one of the perennial
problems in philosophy of biology.
Ernst Mayr’s classic 1961 article in Science, ‘‘Cause and Effect in Biology,’’
defended a now widely recognized approach to such teleological language by
introducing the term ‘‘teleonomy’’ and claiming that there are two sorts of questions
that evolutionary biology is in the position to answer when it comes to basic
questions like why birds migrate: ‘‘How?’’ questions and ‘‘Why?’’ questions (Mayr
1961). These two questions established a distinction between so-called ‘‘proximate’’
causes that investigate the mechanics of ‘‘how’’ bird movement works and
‘‘ultimate’’ causes that tell us the reason ‘‘why’’ birds migrate. Mayr’s influential
distinction was intended to outline how Neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology could
domesticate the language of purposiveness on a solid scientific foundation without
any spooky metaphysical remainder (Mayr 1961).
The first aim of this paper is to examine more carefully how Mayr and Neo-
Darwinian evolutionary biologists since Mayr have dealt with the status of
teleological language and to provide a typology for organizing the philosophical
options that are currently available. The second aim is to juxtapose these
‘‘evolutionary’’ approaches with alternative ‘‘non-evolutionary’’ approaches to
purposiveness in biology recently developed in writings of the Neo-Aristotelian
philosophers Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot (Thompson 2008; Foot 2003;
Grene 1974). In the course of setting out these approaches, I argue that the key
concept for ‘‘non-evolutionary’’ approaches is the concept of a life-cycle pattern. In
the final section, I argue that differences between these two approaches to the
theoretical foundations of teleological language reveal a deep disagreement over
what sorts of answers can be given to ‘‘why’’ questions in biology. I contrast these
approaches by analyzing how each would address the question of the purpose or
function of reproduction and argue that there is a flaw in Neo-Darwinian
assumptions about the purpose that reproduction serves. By criticizing both the
notion that reproduction serves a purpose and the notion that reproduction should
have the status of ‘‘ultimacy’’ with regard to an organism’s activities, I show that
non-evolutionary approaches offer a desirable corrective to the idea that
evolutionary biology offers an ‘‘ultimate’’ explanation of life and purposiveness
in nature.
2 Are there natural purposes?
It appears obvious to the many ‘‘lay’’ viewers of David Attenborough documen-
taries, thanks to their evocative narrator, that the arena of life requires concepts of
challenge, struggle, success, achievement, and strategy to be understood. Organisms
face ecological challenges that they must overcome; life itself is a challenge, a
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struggle, and even a competitive game. However, the use of language of avoiding
costs to reap benefits, the application of optimality models, and the use of game-
theory to understand evolutionary strategies and pay-offs show that intentional
language is not only restricted to the laity. Depicting an organism’s life as the
overcoming of a series of challenges, as requiring ecological problem-solving, or
conceiving behavior as competitive or cooperative implicitly relies on an
intentional-sounding language of implied objectives whose place in nature can
seem puzzling. A challenge is something that stands in the way of a goal, a strategy
is a plan of action toward a goal, and cooperation or competition usually only ensues
between two or more parties striving to achieve the same objective. It appears hard
to shake off the sense that the metaphor of a game really does capture something
about life and its evolution, and that the producers of these documentaries have done
an extraordinary job acquainting us with astonishing strategies within it.
The philosophical puzzles that this language raises are basic and they address our
understanding of basic properties of the physical world: can blind bits of matter
really have purposes? Can living things have goals and objectives, can they really
be said to be competing or even cooperating when they have no knowledge of these
goals and no idea of the eventual effects of their activities? Is such language just an
anthropomorphic or metaphorical projection, or perhaps a pragmatically useful
heuristic, or does the living world really present an arena that contains purposive
organization and directed activity? The problem of teleology in nature has been a
locus of philosophical interest since Aristotle because it was at the basis of his
understanding of life, nature, and of the organization of the cosmos as a whole. It is
particularly important because Aristotle regarded human capacities of theoretical
and practical reasoning, goal-directed agency, and intention as instances of more
general purposive features of the biological world. Many philosophers today still
find it compelling to distinguish living things from non-living things within the
realm of different types of entities specifically through their apparently purposive
organization and behavior and through the resistance that this organization poses to
being explained away or reduced to principles of the non-living matter that form its
constituent parts. This paper is concerned with the purposive characteristics of
living activity generally, and not with the more obvious purposive nature of
conscious human behavior and thought, although this might be seen as a local
example of the more general problem.
It is clear why it appears that these philosophical puzzles must be addressed
today by reflecting on the most powerful explanation of the organization of the
living world and its change over time that we possess: Darwin’s theory of evolution
by natural selection. Pioneers in Neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology like R.A.
Fisher, J.B.S. Haldane, William Hamilton, Richard Lewontin, and John Maynard
Smith established the rigorous theoretical foundations that now underwrite
widespread notions of games, strategies, and success. Works like Richard Dawkins’
The Selfish Gene in 1976 further cemented notions of evolutionary winning and
losing in scientific and lay discourse. The natural way of speaking about living
things as navigating ecological challenges, solving problems, having interests,
competing and cooperating to gain benefits and avoid costs is part of conceptual
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armory of both scientists and the popular audience. Yet this language still generates
puzzles because of the directed character of the activities it describes.
Ernst Mayr’s early 1961 paper was a classic attempt to delineate a sound
theoretical and scientific basis for the teleological notions of purposiveness that
underlie these strategic conceptions of the living world within a structure of
explanation focused exclusively on the question of causation. Mayr divided the
central questions of biology first into ‘‘How?’’ questions, which seek the
physiological and eventually genetic mechanisms that underlie the various
capacities, functions, and behaviors of living things. But, Mayr also argued that
ultimate questions of ‘‘Why?’’ fall within the purview of evolutionary theory and
these were the questions gave rise to teleological language. Our original example
can help distinguish what we might be looking for in asking these two kinds of
questions. We might ask the ‘‘how’’ question of what causal mechanisms trigger
bird flight, sustain it, and are involved in ending travel, but we might also ask
‘‘why’’ a bird migrates by seeking a rationale for this behavior and treating the bird
as if it were seeking to achieve certain aims and acting strategically to do so.
Understanding how Mayr approached the ‘‘Why?’’ question is crucial for
understanding how he was able to solve, or perhaps better dissolve, the puzzle of
teleological language. For Mayr, when we ask ‘‘Why?’’ an animal is the way it is or
does what it does, the answer is really a re-packaged sort of ‘‘How?’’ question.
Mayr’s ‘‘Why?’’ does not really ask for a reason, for a purpose, or for a rationale,
but rather for another sort of causal mechanism that is not to be found within the
lifespan or current functioning of the individual organism, but in its phylogenetic
ancestry and evolutionary history (Mayr 1961, p. 1503). The reason ‘‘why’’ the
warbler on Mayr’s New Hampshire porch started his southward migration on the
summer night of August 25th, he famously argued, is because their ancestors who
showed the same heritable behaviour reproduced successfully. No warbler needs to
be understood as having any goal—most importantly, it need not even be conceived
as having the goal of fitness or successful reproduction to account for any of its
individual behaviors, such as migrating. The warbler’s purposive-seeming behavior
is just the playing out of a genetic ‘‘program,’’ as Mayr called termed it (Mayr 1961,
p. 1504). This behavior was the effect of an ordered mass of evolved proximate
causal mechanisms that we find in nature because they were the products of a real
causal series of successful reproducers. For Mayr, where there is no intention or
representation of the action, there is no real purpose or rationale.
So, Mayr really erased any valid notions of objectives from the biological world
by reformulating the implied ‘‘in order to…’’ that is used to describe the act of travel
that the warbler undertakes as another type of mechanistic and causal ‘‘how?’’
question. This offered a strategy for seriously qualifying, denying, or rendering
unnecessary teleological rationales that is still common among working biologists
describing and seeking explanations of the behaviors and traits of living things. But
not all evolutionary biologists or philosophers deal with purposive language in this
manner. Niko Tinbergen’s famous ‘‘four questions’’ provides an analytic framework
of evolutionary thinking that has been especially influential for scientists studying
behavior and that preserves a more robust role for notions of purpose (Tinbergen
1963). Alongside problems of ontogeny and phylogeny that Mayr used to
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distinguish between so-called ‘‘proximate’’ and ‘‘ultimate’’ causes, Tinbergen
included the question of adaptive ‘‘function’’ as a fundamental biological
explanandum. Tinbergen accepted that the function or purpose of a trait is a
genuine phenomenon to be explained, independent of proximate or ultimate causal
mechanisms, but the adjective ‘‘adaptive’’ ensured that functions were to be
explained solely in terms of non-purposive effects on survival and reproduction.
Indeed, the field of behavioral ecology today views behavior as a ‘‘trait’’ like any
other that is subject to natural selection and follows Tinbergen in conceiving of
behavior too in functional terms to be explained through the effect of behavior on
reproductive success (Krebs, Davies, and West 2012). What is important to notice
here is that Tinbergen’s more robust concept of adaptive function underscores a new
kind of biological cause, another answer to a ‘‘why’’ question that begins
‘‘because…’’, in addition to Mayr’s two conceptions of biological causation. Mayr’s
warbler migrates south on August 25th because the behavior serves an adaptive
purpose related to survival and reproduction. In this usage, teleological language
does capture something about biological reality that cannot be captured without it or
rendered in non-teleological terms, but this teleological character is still
‘‘ultimately’’ explained by the features of how the evolutionary process of natural
selection works.
For readers familiar with the large philosophical literature on functions, my goal
in the following is not to rehash important debates over etiological and dispositional
accounts of function (See McLaughlin 2001 for an excellent summary of these
debates and for defense of an Aristotelian position; see also Ariew, Cummins, &
Perlman 2002 for a wide-ranging set of recent essays; and Lewens 2005 for a
detailed and informative discussion of teleological language in biology). Instead,
my aim is to relate these debates to what we might call ‘‘meta-theoretical’’
disagreements related to teleological language. This initial discussion of Mayr and
Tinbergen allows us to make a few distinctions regarding the ways evolutionary
biologists can interpret purposive language, its basis in nature, and its validity. Both
Mayr’s and Tinbergen’s reformulations show subtly distinct paths. One path is to
argue that organisms, their traits, and their behaviors are not purposively organized
or directed at all, and that this is merely an anthropomorphic human error that gives
a false picture of nature and is to be avoided. This can be called error theory of
teleology, in analogy to the ‘‘error theory’’ in moral philosophy which claims that
there are no mind-independent normative facts that our moral judgments are guided
by. Mayr’s reformulation of ‘‘why’’ questions into ‘‘how’’ questions of biological
programming and both genetic and evolutionary causation can be read as the view
that teleological judgments are systematically false and misleading. When we ask
the natural question of ‘‘why’’ an individual organism does something, the only
legitimate answer refers to physiological causes and evolved mechanisms, not to
rationales, goals, or purposes. This discussion of biological teleology of course sets
aside for the moment the peculiar case of organisms with higher cognitive
capacities, such as ourselves, whose intentional capacities may resist such an
explaining away of its directed features.
The second strategy is to argue that although teleological judgments are
anthropomorphic, the idea of a purpose or objective has heuristic value and it is
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helpful—indeed necessary—to view living things ‘‘as if’’ they are purposively
organized and directed, even if they are not in fact so. This view can be called
methodological teleology. It has its historical roots in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of
Judgment, which argued that teleological judgments ascribing purposiveness to
organisms and their traits are regulative principles that guide our inquiry into nature
rather than constitutive principles that make experience of a mind-independent
world possible. Contemporary evolutionary thinkers often modify this Kantian
doctrine by proposing that teleological language can be useful as a shorthand for
more technical and scientifically correct causal descriptions, like Mayr’s, that are
too cumbersome to use on every occasion. Daniel Dennett’s ‘‘design stances’’ is an
instance of such a view (Dennett 1987, p. 16). We talk of organisms making
decisions, executing strategies, and having wants, needs and drives, and seeking
reproductive success, but this is a deliberate shorthand for enormously complex
mechanical processes that make up organisms and the causal history of mutation
and selection that has generated them. The mechanisms underlying observed
features of biological entities may be thought to be too complex for the human mind
to grasp comprehensively (at present or perhaps permanently) and so we might
require such simplifying shorthands. Alternatively, such teleological heuristics can
be thought of as satisfying our evolved intuitive cognitive capacities, such as an
innate ‘‘theory of mind,’’ which has itself been fashioned by the selective
evolutionary pressures of complex social environments to detect intentionality and
seek ‘‘naı¨ve’’ biological explanation in terms of rationales and purposes (Atran
1998). These innate capacities account for the cognitive need we have to explain
traits and behaviors according to purposes and reasons in addition to identifying
causes and mechanisms that gave rise to them (See Godfrey-Smith 2009 for a
critique of evolutionary explanations in the form of rationales). In either of these
two strategies, teleological judgments concerning the purposive activity and
organization of living things may be a useful aid, even to scientists, but they are not,
strictly speaking, true. Methodological teleology should, then, be regarded as a
special form of error theory because its account of teleology maintains an anti-
realist stance, and I submit that it is probably the dominant view in the philosophy of
biology today.
Mayr’s view is a form of error theory and Tinbergen’s minimalist sense of
‘‘function’’ as adaptive effect on reproductive success can be neatly fitted within
Mayr’s largely reductionist and genome-centered picture in the form of method-
ological teleology. But there remains a third Neo-Darwinian perspective on
teleology that need not be anti-realist in these senses and that can defend a more
robust version of Tinbergen’s notion of function. This view argues that organisms
are really purposive in organization and behavior and that it is precisely Darwin’s
theory of evolution by natural selection that licenses this teleological conception.
This position can be called Darwinian teleological realism. Such a view sees
Darwin’s achievement as two-fold. Not only did Darwin explain evolutionary
change over time through differential effect of traits on reproductive success, he
also provided a principle of natural, non-intentional, design in the living world
(Gardner 2009; Grafen 2006; West and Gardner 2013). A view of this sort stresses
that Darwin’s theory did not change the subject or eliminate the discourse of design
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found in the writings of natural theologians like William Paley, but rather replaced
theological and super-naturalistic design-principles and purposes with design-
principles grounded in an understanding of the causal structure of the evolutionary
process and observation of the ecological conditions that organisms inhabit.
Organisms are purposively organized wholes, their traits do serve purposes, they
have goals, and these goals explain their behavior. Darwin’s view of the
evolutionary process is to be even more admired because it explains both how
this is possible and what the goal of an organism really is. The important point is
that this conception is committed to a more robust, realist view of teleology and it
sees evolutionary biology as licensing this.
3 Neo-Darwinian purposes in biology
The Darwinian teleological realist conception has always revolved around the
concept of ‘‘fitness’’ and the two distinct roles that this concept can and has played.
First, ‘‘fitness’’ captures the Darwinian insight that traits that positively affect the
number of reproducing offspring of their bearers will come to proliferate in
populations of living things over time. It is a description of the mechanism by which
populations change over time in ways that accumulate adaptive traits, which are
simply traits that belong to successful reproducers and contribute to reproductive
success. This notion of fitness is, at least theoretically, if not always practically, a
measurable quantity that captures the underlying causal structure of evolutionary
outcomes, especially the complex and local adaptations that astonished naturalists
like Paley and Darwin and still astonish us. Biological traits and capacities initially
arise as a result of the cumulative process of descent, inheritance, and modification,
and they spread through populations only because they have a positive or neutral
effect on reproductive success.
The second notion of ‘‘fitness’’ is a telos, or goal that accounts for the unified
functioning and organization of the whole organism. It is a ‘‘design-principle’’ that
explains how the parts of an organism fit together to form a functioning, unified
whole by identifying a so-called ‘‘ultimate’’ objective that all traits and behaviors of
an individual contribute to (Gardner 2009; West and Gardner 2013; Fitzpatrick
2011). Darwin’s account of adaptive change through natural selection provided a
principle of what an adaptation is, namely, a trait that has been preserved and spread
because it had the effect of increasing reproductive success of individuals relative to
those without the trait. Thus, evolutionary biology answers the question of ‘‘why’’
traits have been selected by appealing to a cause that also offers a reason or
rationale: because they contribute to reproductive success. Over the long duree´ of
evolutionary time, as organisms evolve and accumulate adaptations, all of their parts
become more and more functionally integrated around the single, unified aim—the
key evolutionary criterion of selection. Reproductive success then acquires the
status of a principle of unity and organized functioning of the whole organism. It
explains ‘‘why’’ an organism is organized the way it is and ‘‘why’’ it behaves the
way that it does through reference to a goal. Rather than eschew evolutionary
rationales like Mayr, the Darwinian teleological realist argues that the process of
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evolution by natural selection produces organisms that are designed to seek and
achieve a goal.
Defenders of the idea of ‘‘fitness’’ as the ‘‘ultimate’’ goal of the organism argue
that this conception can be derived through reflection on how the evolutionary
process that generates organisms imprints itself upon them. Alan Grafen has written
extensively in defense of mathematical models that depict evolution as a process of
optimization and his work is a prime example of a defense of Darwinian
teleological realism. He argues that this view has its roots in R.A. Fisher’s
fundamental theorem of natural selection, which states that ‘‘non-random changes in
gene frequency always change mean fitness positively. No other aspect of the
genotypic changes of a population has a systematic optimizing tendency’’ (Grafen
2003, p. 325). He writes further that ‘‘the fundamental theorem tells us what it is that
the design-creating capacity of evolution regards as good design. It must increase
the partial fitness of the individual: not the individual’s longevity, or happiness, or
intelligence or complexity’’ (Grafen 2003, p. 326 my emphasis; Fitzpatrick 2011).
For Grafen, it is the optimizing tendency of evolution by natural selection that
justifies the conception of a unified ultimate goal as the crucial explanatory principle
in evolutionary theory. Because organisms behave as ‘‘rational creatures maximiz-
ing a utility function,’’ one can model behavior and speak of the purpose of an
organism as a whole in relation to the ultimate, or final, end of reproductive success
(Grafen 2003, p. 326).
Conceptions of fitness have of course been modified since Darwin, as shown by
foundational debates in social evolution that have sharpened these issues. Since
William Hamilton introduced the concept of ‘‘inclusive fitness’’ in 1964, researchers
in the evolution of social behavior have challenged the idea that individual
reproductive success simpliciter is the telos that explains organismal functioning
and behavior (Hamilton 1964). Hamilton helped make sense of traits that proliferate
and yet do not appear to increase the fitness of organisms that possess them. The
idea of ‘‘indirect fitness’’ was used to understand the organization and behavior of
organisms that are not capable of reproducing at all, like sterile worker ants, for
whom it would for obvious reasons be problematic to claim that the natural goal for
which they are organized is their individual reproductive success. Today, influential
theorists, including Alan Grafen quoted earlier, regard Hamilton’s central insight to
be that the aim of individual organisms is the spread of their genetically
heritable traits, whether ‘‘directly’’ through their own reproduction or ‘‘indirectly’’
by aiding the reproduction of relatives who are highly likely to share those traits
(Grafen 2006; West and Gardner 2013). This conception of ‘‘inclusive fitness’’
refines the second conception of ‘‘fitness’’ by identifying a subtly more expansive
objective that accounts for the unified design of whole organisms, but it maintains
the view of individual organisms as really goal-directed and agential in the sense I
am outlining here (See Birch and Okasha 2015 for a helpful analysis of this issue).
Indeed, the very same defenders of the notion of an evolutionary design-principle
argue that the notion of inclusive fitness helps us understand that groups of
organisms can become purposive entities as well. Andy Gardner and Alan Grafen
have argued that the same Darwinian logic that tells us what individual organisms
are designed to do can predict circumstances under which social groups can and will
23 Page 8 of 22 P. Woodford
123
become be adaptive entities as well. These are circumstances in which within group
competition is negligible and the inclusive fitness ‘‘interests’’ (note that this
widespread term also imputes teleological characteristics to organisms) of
interacting individual organisms are aligned (Gardner and Grafen 2009). I will
return to this point later on in considering the contrasts between Neo-Aristotelian
and Neo-Darwinian conceptions of natural purpose. For now, these Darwinian
teleological realists help us appreciate that theorists distinguish between a gene-
centered focus on ‘‘units of selection’’ and a focus on whole organisms as ‘‘units of
adaptation’’ where purposiveness begins to appear (Gardner 2014). Natural
selection acts by changing gene-frequencies, but it is only at the level of whole
organisms—and in special cases of purposively integrated groups (so-called
‘‘superorganisms’’)—that adaptatively purposive traits appear.
This account of course entangles us in contentious theoretical debates currently
going on in the science of social evolution. Mathematical biologists applying game
theory to social evolution have recently questioned both ‘‘fitness’’ and ‘‘indirect
fitness’’ as unified design-principles, asking whether evolutionary biology and the
theory of social evolution require teleological principles to explain organismal
behavior at all (Allen et al. 2013; Birch and Okasha 2015). Individual organisms,
especially sterile ones, may be maximizing different fitness ‘‘quantities’’—as
mathematical biologists often refer to that which is maximized through behavior—
in different biological systems and at different levels of biological organization:
Genes, cells, individuals, and groups. Evolutionary biology should avoid the
temptation to think in terms of universal quantities (such as number of offspring)
that all organisms in general are seeking to maximize, and instead focus on what
conditions lead to the outcome that certain behavioral traits, especially social ones
that affect others of the same species, proliferate in dynamic populations. Ben Allen
and Martin Nowak argue that ‘‘both theory and experiment have shown that
frequency-dependent selection can lead to complex dynamical phenomena such as
multiple and mixed equilibria, limit cycles, and chaotic attractors, ruling out the
possibility of general maximands. Thus, evolution does not, in general, lead to the
maximization of inclusive fitness or any other quantity’’ (Allen et al. 2013, p. 20138
my emphasis). These critics of the inclusive fitness theory of social behavior write
further that a ‘‘straight-forward genetic approach’’ to the evolution of social
behavior focuses on the question ‘‘under what conditions are mutations favored by
natural selection? The target of selection is not the individual but the allele or the
genomic ensemble’’ (Allen et al. 2013, p. 20138). It is ambiguous whether or not
these critics of inclusive fitness reject the need for teleological principles altogether
or if they simply reject any general or universal principles that apply to all
biological systems as such. But there are philosophers who have taken these
criticisms of all teleological ‘‘design-principles’’ to their limits. Peter Godfrey-
Smith, for example, rejects the teleological and agential view of organisms in total,
arguing that the only valid question for evolutionary biology is not ‘‘to what end?’’ a
living thing acts or ‘‘who benefits?’’ from an organism’s traits but rather: ‘‘Suppose
a population exists and some phenotype emerges—what is likely to happen to it?’’
(Godfrey-Smith 2009, p. 145).
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These recent debates over the teleological character of the concept of inclusive
fitness leave us with philosophical options that were already foreshadowed by Mayr.
His approach is a historical antecedent of strategies that drop talk of goals and
agency from biology altogether, concentrating on genetic programs and mechanisms
while downplaying the explanatory significance or usefulness of recognizing whole
organisms to be teleologically organized entities. This option is reinforced by the
fact that individual organisms carry significance for the study of evolution primarily
as temporary bearers of heritable traits, which are the ‘‘units of selection.’’ Since
‘‘straightforward genetic approach’’ to evolutionary change focuses on gene
frequencies, the purposive organization of whole organisms and the directed
character of their behavior need not come into view at all as a pressing
explanandum, an explanans, or as a privileged ‘‘unit’’ of biological reality.
Evolutionary biology is the study of the origins, spread, fates, and effects of these
traits over time, and the attempt perhaps even to predict them; it can therefore
ignore the scientific and explanatory significance of recognizing the agential
character of whole organisms.
On the other hand, if the purposive organization and behavior of whole
organisms is a genuine explanandum, the only valid evolutionary foundation that
can account for it is the sort found in defenders of ‘‘inclusive fitness.’’ Defenders of
the second conception of fitness uphold the ‘‘adaptationist’’ tradition that they
rightly trace back to Darwin himself (See Birch and Okasha 2015; Lewens 2009 for
helpful discussions of adaptationism). They underscore the view that Darwinism
explains individuals and their life-cycles as purposively organized and acting
wholes—as privileged ‘‘units’’ of adaptation—that come to exhibit this purposive-
ness precisely due to the dynamics of the process of evolution by natural selection.
This process licenses the view of whole organisms as agents with real purposes,
even if they are not aware of these purposes (Grafen 2003, p. 326). As we have seen,
if the ‘‘goal’’ of reproductive success is a genuine one, a limited normative
vocabulary of success and failure is licensed and so is a conception of what it means
for an individual or population to ‘‘flourish’’ in evolutionary terms, namely to
survive and reproduce over extended periods of time (Fitzpatrick 2011). Since
individuals have an inherent Darwinian objective, anything that hinders the
achievement of this objective is a genuine cost to the organism and anything that
contributes to it is an evolutionary benefit.
This section has shown that there are disagreements about the status of
teleological language internal to Neo-Darwinian theory and that Neo-Darwinian
theory can align with either ‘‘realist’’ or ‘‘anti-realist’’ views of the teleological
conceptions of the traits and behaviors of living things. The error theorist and
methodological teleologist views reject the reality of teleological properties of
organisms altogether, while the Darwinian ‘‘realist’’ sees the basis for such
principles in the way that the selective dynamics of evolution shape organisms. This
section has also aimed to show that regardless of which road one takes here, the
problem of teleology is intertwined with the question of how we understand the
scientifically valid ways of answering ‘‘why’’ questions. If the Neo-Darwinist has an
answer to the question of ‘‘why’’ birds migrate that offers a rationale and refers to
real ‘‘goals’’ or ‘‘purposes’’—for example, of the sort that birds migrate in order to
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find insects to eat, etc.—these can only be the ‘‘ultimate’’ purposes of fitness or
inclusive fitness maximization. A bird migrates in order to maximize its fitness or
inclusive fitness; migration occurs because it contributes to survival and reproduc-
tion. In the next section, I consider an alternative, Neo-Aristotelian approach to the
problem of teleology that maintains realism but rejects its Darwinian and
evolutionary basis.
4 Natural purpose for Neo-Aristotelians
Recent Neo-Aristotelian writers have developed an approach to purposiveness in
biology independently of the Neo-Darwinian positions described above. These
thinkers challenge sweeping statements like Theodosius Dobzhansky’s famous
remark that ‘‘nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.’’ They
argue that if organisms do require teleological concepts for what they are and what
they do to be made intelligible, then the basis of this fact about what they are is
independent of the question of how they have come to be in nature. Neo-Aristotelian
philosophers Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot give purposive language a
privileged place in descriptions of biological reality because they see such language
as constitutive of our representations of this reality in the first place. Teleology is,
for this reason, independent of and prior to—in the sense of constitutive of our
representation of—biological entities, and so too of our inquiry into the Darwinian
process through which their characteristics change over time.
The decisive differences between the Neo-Aristotelians and the previous
positions we have surveyed can be seen already in their unique starting points.
Thompson and Foot begin their investigation of the concepts needed to make sense
of living things with a description of individual whole organisms, their activities
within their wider ecological context, and the way particular behaviors and
constitutive cellular and molecular processes fit into unfolding life-cycle patterns.
As Thompson writes, teleological judgments do not offer a single, so-called
‘‘ultimate’’ objective that explains organism structure and behavior; instead, ‘‘they
articulate relations of dependence among various elements and aspects and phases
of a given kind of life’’ (Thompson 2008, p. 294). Thompson argues that even basic
activities such as eating can only be identified as eating by regarding the animal’s
locomotion, its chewing, the passage of the material through its digestive tract, its
eventual defecation, etc. as processes of nourishment and waste removal. But by
doing so, such events are already regarded as ‘‘vital activities,’’ that is, as events that
have functional roles within the wider context of an unfolding form of life that make
the future phases in the life-cycle possible (Thompson 2008, p. 57). To regard such
phenomena as ‘‘vital activities’’ that contribute to the maintenance and development
of the organism through its life-history is already to regard them as purposive and
teleological. Moreover, teleological descriptions of ‘‘vital activities,’’ such as
‘‘eating,’’ identify principles of change and persistence in a living thing that are
internal to its particular way of sustaining itself and making a living.
Thompson’s account of living individuals and life-cycle patterns is part of a more
general and ambitious project. These vital descriptions of individuals, he argues, are
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possible only in relation to the conception of common, more general ‘‘life-forms’’
that individuals exemplify. The description of a shared ‘‘life-form’’ comprises what
he calls a ‘‘natural history account’’ of a species or more general group to which
individuals belong, and this account is constituted by a set of ‘‘Aristotelian
categoricals,’’ as Thompson calls them. These are statements that are true of
individuals but are also more true of the more general, supra-individual patterns of
life that individuals are tokens of. The decisive point that Thompson makes is that
our judgments about the functions, capacities, and behaviores of living things
depend upon identifying such supra-individual patterns. An ‘‘Aristotelian categor-
ical’’ would be of the form ‘‘warblers in New Hampshire migrate to the south at the
end of summer.’’ Thompson’s key argument is that one can only identify and
describe the warbler, its traits, and its behavior in the first place through ‘‘vital
description.’’ To even call the warbler’s movement ‘‘migration,’’ or more
fundamentally to call a chunk of DNA a ‘‘gene,’’ is to ascribe it a purposive
place within a wider context of living activity (thanks to Micah Lott for this
important point). It is crucial for the Neo-Aristotelian position that it is only on the
basis of these teleological, vital descriptions that we are also able to judge whether
individuals are functioning well or badly. For example, if a warbler failed to migrate
and perished as a result, we would be in the position to judge that something had
gone wrong in this particular warbler. The Neo-Aristotelian argues that this is not
because we know from evolutionary theory that the warbler’s goal is to reproduce as
abundantly as possible and it has not done so, but rather because we know from
observing general patterns of warbler life-cycles that migration serves a vital
function in allowing the warbler to sustain itself (Thompson 2008, p. 68).
Thompson’s treatment of biological teleology is merely preparatory ground-
clearing for a larger argument that normative evaluation of human action is of the
same logical form as judgments of the function and dysfunction of biological traits
in living things more generally. These larger meta-ethical aspects of Thompson’s
project require mentioning, but the salient point he makes about biological teleology
for the purpose of this paper is that we can only first identify what any individual is
doing ‘‘now’’ in terms of its vital activities, and we cannot arrive at an accurate
conception of its vital activities except by relating them to more general life-cycle
patterns that we have observed in other individuals who share the same life-form.
Moreover, it is crucial to Thompson that judgments about life-cycle patterns are not
merely statistical generalizations from individual observations, since most or all of
the organisms we are observing need not live out their life-cycle and yet the ‘‘vital
activities’’ that occur can still only be identified as such in relation to such a
conception (Thompson 2008, p. 68). ‘‘Aristotelian categoricals’’ are claims about
general aspects of the form of life the organism in question bears and what internal
processes, traits, and behaviors are necessary conditions of the possibility that it
unfolds.
Considering Mayr’s example of bird migration from this perspective once again
helps to show how starkly Thompson’s Neo-Aristotelian view of teleology differs
from the variety of Darwinian theorists mentioned in the first section. Recall that
when asked why the warbler on Mayr’s porch migrates south at the end of the
summer, Mayr answered that it is because ancestors with the same genetic make-up
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that ‘‘programs’’ migratory behavior given a certain seasonal change in temperature
successfully reproduced and the warblers that one is presently observing have
inherited these traits. When asked why warblers migrate south at the end of the
summer, a Neo-Aristotelian response would be simply that they do so in order to
reach a climate with more insects to eat. By calling the movement of the warbler
‘‘migration’’ we are already mobilizing a form of judgment that considers it a
‘‘vital’’ activity that serves a purpose within the organism’s unfolding life-cycle
(See McLaughlin 2001 for a defense of teleology grounded in the features of self-
sustaining, self-replicating systems, of which organic life-cycles are a paradigmatic
example). This ‘‘first-order’’ identification and description cannot be rendered into
‘‘non-teleological’’ facts about phylogenetic history, ontogenetic development,
genetic ‘‘programming’’ or the temperature changes that might induce the
movement of limbs involved in the southward journey.
Philippa Foot elegantly summarizes the Neo-Aristotelian view of teleology in her
book Natural Goodness. There, she offers a word of caution intended to preempt the
objection that this explicit purposive language requires any metaphysically
worrisome assumptions that the activity so described is intentional. She writes:
[T]he male peacock displays his brilliant tail in order to attract a female during
mating season. The display serves this purpose. Let us call such language
purposive language. But be careful here! Where something that S’s do is, in
this sense, purposive we should beware of slipping over into saying of an
individual S that it has this purpose when it does this thing. Plants grow
upwards in order to get to the light, but it is fanciful to say that that is what my
honeysuckle is trying to do or that is ‘its end.’ Migrating birds flying off in
order to reach the southern insects do not have this end or purpose even though
it could be said to be the end or purpose of the operation. (Foot 2003, p. 31)
Speaking of living activity as purposive in the Neo-Aristotelian sense (and in the
Neo-Darwinian sense) does not require the assumption of mental capacities,
intentions, or cognition in any plant, animal, insect, or cell. But, it does require
recognition of the peculiar relations of causal dependence that link an organism’s
activities to past, present, and future phases of the pattern of living activity that it
bears. An organism displays a functional unity of interdependence between its parts
and the whole, between its individual actions here and now, and its past and future.
Foot’s semantic correction is important: Organisms as such do not have purposes or
‘‘ends,’’ but their traits and behaviors serve purposes. This functional unity and
identity over time of an organism’s unfolding life-cycle is the context in which traits
or behaviors can contribute to purposive vital activities at all, and through which
these traits and behaviors can first be identified as the specific vital activities that
they are.
Foot also specifically addresses the relation of this Neo-Aristotelian account of
purposive language in biology to evolutionary theory in a manner that deserves full
quotation. She writes:
The history of a species is not, however, the subject with which Aristotelian
categoricals deals. Their truth is truth about a species at a given historical
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time, and it is only the relative stability of at least the most general features of
the different species of living things that makes these propositions possible at
all. They tell of how a kind of animal, considered at a particular time and in its
natural habitat, develops, sustains itself, defends itself, and reproduces. It is
only insofar as ‘stills’ can be made from the moving picture of the evolution of
species that we can have a natural history account of the life of a particular
kind of living thing. And it is only insofar as we have a ‘natural history
account’ that we can have a ‘vital description’ of individuals here and now.
(Foot 2003, p. 29)
For both Thompson and Foot, describing the causal unfolding of life-cycle patterns
is a task for biologists that is distinct from the task of understanding the natural-
historical emergence, patterns of change, and even the underlying molecular
‘‘mechanisms’’ that have made such forms possible. Indeed, both Thompson and
Foot rightly argue that the vital description of biological entities—describing what
they are, how their parts ‘‘hang together,’’ and what they do—must antecede any
question of origins, whether natural or supernatural, because it tell us what it is that
we are explaining in the first place (Foot 2003, 32). In this way, teleological
language is de-coupled from evolutionary history, but also from natural theology.
Teleological language need not be used in answer to the question of origin or
history, that is, of where living things came from. Instead, it captures the peculiar
relations of interdependence that exist among whole organisms, their parts, and their
behaviors that go on to shape the particular pattern of life that unfolds. In other
words, it captures something about what an organism is as an unfolding and unified
pattern of activity in nature.
This analytical separation of evolutionary questions from what we might call
‘‘evolutionary history’’ questions in biology makes a crucial methodological point,
and contrasting them helps us appreciate is that there are two different things to be
explained. One is internal to the life-cycle of the organism and it is about what is
involved in representing an organism. The other is about how that organism itself
came into being. Before one can explain the ‘‘evolution of’’ any traits, capacities, or
behaviors, or even of organisms themselves, these explananda must first be brought
into view. But vital descriptions involve imputing purposes to behaviors, traits, and
even underlying molecular processes. Both Thompson and Foot insist that even
accurately identifying the most basic behaviors of individual organisms—whether
‘‘eating,’’ ‘‘migrating,’’ ‘‘displaying,’’ ‘‘foraging,’’ or even the much more loaded
language in social behavior of ‘‘cooperating,’’ ‘‘punishing,’’ ‘‘teaching’’—already
involves purposive language (Thompson 2008, p. 54; Foot 2003, p. 36). The
philosophical concern to justify teleological judgments of purposiveness thus does
not come from outside of biology or from any ‘‘external’’ and necessarily
metaphysical interest, but rather from the need to give an account of the status of the
sort of purposive language that we find to be indispensable for identifying and
representing biological or living phenomena in the first place (Thompson 2008,
p. 47).
Both Thompson and Foot thus carve out a unique view of purposiveness
compared to those surveyed in the first section. On the one hand, like the
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mathematical critics of general design-principles such as ‘‘fitness’’ and ‘‘inclusive
fitness’’ that offer a general, so-called ‘‘ultimate’’ purpose to capture the functional
unity and model the behavior of organisms, Neo-Aristotelians argue that the
purposive nature of an organism and its behavior does not require positing a single
ultimate goal. Purposive descriptions and explanations that refer to ‘‘vital activities’’
within the context of an unfolding life-cycle pattern are ultimate in that they
sufficiently answer ‘‘why’’ questions without the need to reference further purposes,
but they do not require us to conceive of natural purpose in terms of a single, unified
goal or objective that all organisms, and all their traits and behaviours, are directed
towards. On the other hand, unlike these critics, Neo-Aristotelians argue that the
purposive nature of biological activity is constitutive of our representation of life, of
what living things are doing, and what is going on inside of them—to get rid of this
language is to fail to bring biological reality into view (Thompson 2008). For this
reason, the wider context of the life-cycle pattern of whole organisms maintains a
distinct priority in the representation of life.
While the Neo-Aristotelian writers surveyed above maintain realist views of the
purposive character of life, this does not appear to be necessary. One can maintain
an error theory or a methodological teleologist account of ‘‘vital descriptions’’ that
impute a teleological character to an organism and its activities. However, Neo-
Aristotelian accounts of the basis of teleological language and its role in making
sense of the biological world insist that these anti-realist accounts are tantamount to
rejecting the reality of living processes. This insistence is certainly behind the
tendency of Neo-Aristotelian thinkers to be realists concerning teleology and behind
their motivation to reject error theory or methodological teleology accounts. But
while it is important to note that rejecting the reality of life is involved in adopting a
non-realist approach to teleology, it is also important to recognize that non-realist
interpretations of teleological language do not appear to be incompatible with Neo-
Aristotelian perspectives on the theoretical basis and role of this language in the
representation of life. We might still maintain that although distinctly living
processes require teleological concepts to even be represented, the mind-indepen-
dent world does not indeed contain such processes.
5 Neo-Darwinism and Neo-Aristotelianism: questioning the purpose
of reproduction
The Darwinian teleological realist will no doubt object at this point that this cannot
be where the story ends; there is a reason why reproduction is considered the event
whereby an organism fulfills its raison d’eˆtre in evolutionary thinking. The Neo-
Aristotelian teleological realist argues that the foundational license for viewing
even the simplest organisms as purposive lies in the peculiar causal interdependence
of phases and processes in a life-cycle pattern that teleological judgments pick out.
But an evolutionist will insist that life-cycle patterns (and of course the variety of
life-cycles organisms go through) are not simply ready-made, they are shaped by
selective, evolutionary pressures. The first section showed that the Darwinian
teleological realist justifies purposive language by regarding the process of
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evolution as yielding whole organisms that are organized so as to allow them to
spread their genetically controlled and heritable traits efficiently and abundantly.
Indeed, on the basis of this framework, scientists working in the area of life-history
evolution argue that life-cycle patterns of maturation, growth, age of reproduction,
and senescence can be demonstrated to optimize between specific trade-offs forced
on organisms by biological, social, and ecological conditions and constraints
(Stearns 1992). Discovering life-cycle patterns, traits, and behaviors that optimize
various aspects of life-cycle necessary for reproductive success in tandem with
biological and environmental constraints is taken as evidence for the Darwinian
view that natural selection shapes organisms with the sole ultimate objective of
spreading their genes (Krebs, Davies, and West 2012).
If such a Darwinian rejoinder is committed to an error theory with regard to
teleology and so to this notion of an ultimate objective, then it is surely
incompatible with Neo-Aristotelian teleological realism. But if the notion of an
ultimate evolutionary objective is interpreted in terms of methodological teleology,
then it is not in principle incompatible with Neo-Aristotelian teleological realism.
What this means is that Neo-Aristotelian realists can accept the concept of an
ultimate goal as merely a formalized heuristic tool that helps scientists investigate
and model behavior, model evolutionary outcomes, and reveal how complex
behavioral repertoires emerge and interact to determine such outcomes. At the same
time, they can insist that organisms are still genuinely purposive entities, but
representation of their purposive nature is not grounded in and does not require the
notion of an ultimate goal. When it comes to contrast between the Darwinian
teleological realist and the Neo-Aristotelian realist views, the conflict is much more
pronounced.
The first thing to recognize is that the differences between these two realist views
are not just semantic; they pick out different orders of purposiveness that are
justified by different conceptions of the purposive nature of biological entities. The
key point here is that in raising this form of the question of ‘‘ultimate’’ purpose, the
Darwinian teleological realist too presses us to seek and to provide an explanation
of biological traits and behaviors through reference to an order of purposes. But it is
unique in that it presses us to identify one purpose as the ‘‘ultimate’’ or ‘‘final’’
purpose for the sake of which all other vital activities occur. The ‘‘ultimate’’
objective of inclusive fitness offers a view about the teleological order of purposes
that applies to all vital activity; an individual organism simply is an inclusive
fitness-seeking entity whose objective is the spread of its genes, whether directly
through its own reproduction or indirectly through the success of those who share its
genes. All other vital activities are subordinate and in service to this ‘‘ultimate’’
objective. The power of this view is the way it orients rigorous behavioral
observation, makes predictions about how living things will behave under various
circumstances, and shows unity to the game of life as it is played out in the countless
variety of life-forms. Moreover, this aspect of the Darwinian view underwrites the
widespread claim, explicitly found in writings by Daniel Dennett, that evolutionary
biology offers a so-called ‘‘ultimate’’ explanation of purpose in life (Dennett 1995).
The problem with this Darwinian view can be seen, I suggest, by focusing on
how this view leads us to understand the process of reproduction. The attraction of
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the Darwinian ‘‘ultimate’’ purpose is obvious. It answers an apparent regress of
purposes by identifying an objective for the organism as a whole and for it’s entire
life-cycle pattern. As Foot wrote, ‘‘the male peacock displays his brilliant tail in
order to attract a female during mating season. The display serves this purpose.’’ But
it of course natural to ask what purpose attracting a female serves? What purposive
rationale is there for reproduction? One appealing feature of Richard Dawkins’
classic and influential distinction between replicators and vehicles was that it gives
an answer to this question (Dawkins 1976). The Darwinian ‘‘final end’’ too satisfies
our cognitive need for a regress stopper in the form of a rationale, a ‘‘final’’ rationale
for what an organism is, how it is, and what it does. An organism simply is a
temporary ‘‘vehicle’’ for replicators that program heritable traits and reproduction
serves the purpose of spreading them. The ‘‘gene-centered’’ view here comes to be
favored not only because it provides a sought after account of how evolutionary
change by natural selection works, but also because it offers an ‘‘ultimate’’ purpose
and rationale. Ironically, while Dawkins appears to be critical of and to get rid of
teleological explanation in biology, it is reintroduced at this crucial point.
Of course, the evolutionist need not understand reproduction as purposive in this
way. The right way for the Darwinian teleological realist to make her point is to
resist the temptation to suggest that reproduction serves a purpose (whether of
genes, individuals, groups, or species) while stressing that all other life-cycle events,
vital processes, and behaviors serve the purpose of reproduction. This way of
putting the matter recognizes that we do need not answer the question of what
purpose reproduction serves—i.e., ‘‘why’’ do organisms reproduce? Yet we are right
to seek purposive explanations of an organisms traits and one might still claim that
all behaviors, traits, and phases of an organism’s life cycle serve the sole, ultimate
objective of successful reproduction. Thus, while reproduction itself does not serve
a purpose, other traits and behaviors serve the purpose of reproduction. This
preserves the ‘‘ultimacy’’ of reproduction in the range of an organism’s activities
while resisting the temptation to make claims about the raison d’etre of an
organism.
However, here we must question whether reproduction can be accorded the status
of ‘‘ultimacy’’ and ‘‘finality’’ that the Darwinian teleological realist view gives it.
Nothing about the reproductive phase of the life-cycle forces us to consider it the
vital activity for the sake of which all other vital activities occur. Indeed, it is not
clear that biology requires us to posit a universal purpose of all living activity or to
stop the regress of ‘‘why’’ questions by introducing a single, ‘‘ultimate’’ purpose of
life. Warblers migrate southward from New Hampshire in August in order to find
insects to eat—full stop. There is no need for further purposive explanation of this
activity. This is likely to strike the Darwinian teleological realist as a mistake
because the crucial difference that an evolutionary point of view makes to an
understanding of natural purpose is precisely to highlight the priority of
reproduction in the spectrum of an organism’s goals. But the Neo-Aristotelian
view helps us see that relating an organism’s traits and behaviors to any of its ‘‘vital
activities’’ constitutes a sufficient purposive explanation.
Another way to put this point is to think about the different values placed on
survival and reproduction in evolutionary thought. Because reproductive success is
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the criterion of natural selection and a necessary condition of evolution, thinking
about the process of evolution tempts us to see reproduction as the ‘‘ultimate’’ aim
of the individual organism. It also tempts us to subordinate the organism as a
privileged ‘‘unit’’ of biological reality and to see it as merely a ‘‘vehicle’’ for units
that persist beyond it. But the explanatory pressure to supply an ‘‘ultimate’’ goal
asks for one rationale too many. When thinking not of evolutionary change but
instead of life-cycle patterns of individuals and what is required for them to unfold,
the ‘‘ultimacy’’ of reproduction recedes. Organisms do all sorts of things in the
course of their life-cycles, and the functions of many of their activities can be
identified without referring to reproduction. Indeed, organisms can and do function
even if successful reproduction does not take place (Thompson 2008, p. 68).
If we grant that there is a flaw in the general claim that reproduction serves a
purpose and in the more specific claim of the Darwinian teleological realist that
reproduction has the status of ‘‘ultimacy’’ and ‘‘finality’’ in terms of a character-
ization and explanation of an organism’s traits, there still remains an important point
that the Darwinian view makes to complement the Neo-Aristotelian account of
natural purposiveness. This relates to the dynamic of competition that was so central
to the Darwinian understanding of evolution and that Darwin originally drew from
Thomas Malthus’s writings on population dynamics. As populations increase
through continuous reproductive success, inter-specific competition would ensue
between different ‘‘forms of life’’ and intra-specific competition would ensue for
limited food resources and reproductive opportunities. Empirical field observation
by behavioral ecologists has shown that competition for resources and mating
opportunities is crucial for understanding the purposes that social behaviors come to
serve in the life-histories of organisms (See, for example, Clutton-Brock and Harvey
1995). These dynamics give behavioral, morphological, and physiological traits
distinctively competitive and cooperative purposes within these unfolding life-cycle
patterns.
Neo-Aristotelian conceptions of the teleological organization of individual
organisms can profit from Darwin’s understanding of evolution by incorporating the
view of the living world as an arena in which cooperation and competition takes
place. For instance, aggressive behavior in a female meerkat can often serve the
purpose of protecting a valuable resource or guarding a mate from rivals or it can
help to establish an immigrant male meerkat in a new group by fending off resident
males (See Lott 2012 for an extensive and insightful discussion of these issues in
relation to moral theory). A ‘‘vital description’’ of life-history patterns of
Damaraland mole-rats would surely involve, for example, the fact that the female
‘‘queens’’ of colonies live 25 years longer than ‘‘subordinate’’ females, many of
whom never reproduce successfully and live much shorter lives. This is because
typical female mole-rat life-cycles involve competition for mating opportunities
with unrelated males, and male mole rat life-cycles involve competition for the
chance to mate with the queen. It is examples like these that contributed to the
appeal of Dawkins’ original presentation of the ‘‘selfish’’ objectives of evolutionary
‘‘vehicles’’ and any Neo-Aristotelian account of purposiveness must recognize these
competitive purposes.
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Nonetheless, even here we must be careful to observe that teaming up with others
in the struggle for life is just as prevalent a strategy for meeting vital needs as
competitive struggle, which gives rise to distinctly cooperative purposes as well
(Gardner 2008; Nowak 2011; Kropotkin 1972/1902). The Neo-Darwinian view fills
out the Neo-Aristotelian framework for understanding natural purpose by intensi-
fying our sense for the competitive and cooperative dynamics of social evolution in
light of which ‘‘vital activities’’ need to be understood and identified (Queller and
Strassmann 2009). Another important aspect of the social existence of organisms,
which we briefly encountered in the first section, is that it offers examples of cases
whereby an individual organism’s reproductive phase and life-cycle as a whole can
indeed come to ‘‘serve a purpose’’ beyond itself. This is the case in the examples of
symbiosis studied in the relationship between an organism and its microbiome and
in so-called ‘‘superorganisms’’ such as some insect colonies or multi-cellular
organisms in which individual reproduction is suppressed and individual life-cycles
themselves play a role in the vital activities of a higher-order and functionally
unified whole. In these biological systems, whole organisms themselves can be said
to serve the purpose of reproduction, but in these cases it is of the reproduction of
the higher-order whole organisms and collectives to which they belong. Of course,
while in these cases whole organisms can be said to serve the purpose of
reproduction, the reproduction of these higher-order entities does not serve any
available vital purpose.
In this section, I have argues that it is misguided to see reproduction as serving
the purpose of spreading genes or traits, it is also misguided to see reproduction as
serving the purpose of outcompeting other organisms, and it is misguided to see
reproduction as serving the purpose of evolution as a whole—unless of course one
resorts to a form of theism. The temptation to say things like this is again the sense
that evolutionary biology must, or can, give an answer to the question of what
purpose reproduction serves, of ‘‘why’’ living things reproduce. But for biology,
reproduction must remain a given, ‘‘brute’’ fact. Reproduction serves the purpose of
reproduction; in other words, reproduction is one ‘‘vital activity’’ among others in
the Thompson and Foot sense. But since this is neither informative nor explanatory,
it appears that the question of the purpose of reproduction is not a biologically
meaningful one. Just like Aristotle proposed that living things reproduce in order to
imitate the perfection of the immortal heavenly bodies, biologists and philosophers
today may risk to venture into their own ‘‘myth-making’’ when trying to give an
answer to the question of the ‘‘ultimate’’ purpose of an organism’s life-cycle. The
temptation to propose that evolutionary biology offers a purposive ‘‘ultimate’’
explanation of life, so often succumbed to by self proclaimed ‘‘evolutionists’’ like
Daniel Dennett, or that it says something about the ‘‘ultimate’’ purpose of living
things in nature, is a temptation to exceed what biology, and natural science in
general, can and need offer (Dennett 1995).
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6 Conclusion
Mayr’s (1961) paper posed a fascinating problem that continues to linger in
evolutionary biology and the philosophy of biology and I have tried in this paper to
draw out many of its wider implications—some of them even venturing into
questions that might more accurately be called theological. How can we make sense
of the pervasiveness and apparent indispensability of the language of purpose next
to other kinds of cause and effect in the biological world? Such language is rife in
both scientific literature on evolution and in popular accounts of living things. In
this paper, I have reconstructed different paths in the scientific and philosophical
literature for understanding this language: teleological error theory, methodological
teleology, and finally both Darwinian and Neo-Aristotelian teleological realism.
Teleological error theory and methodological teleology reject the reality of
purposive characteristics of the living activity of whole organisms or their parts
altogether. The Darwinian teleological realist argues that any teleological language
must be understood in relation to an ‘‘ultimate’’ objective of reproduction or that is
derived from how evolution by natural selection shapes organisms and their
behavior. Its focus on mechanisms of causation in evolution leads it to concentrate
on genes and heritable traits as the fundamental ‘‘units’’ of biological reality. The
Neo-Aristotelian argues that purposiveness picks out the peculiar causal inter-
dependence of living activity within the wider context of a life-cycle pattern and the
‘‘vital activities’’ that sustain it. Its ‘‘non-evolutionary’’ focus leads it to view the
organism as the fundamental unit of biological reality. Both Darwinian realist and
Neo-Aristotelian accounts reject ‘‘deflationary’’ accounts, such as Mayr’s, that
translate questions of purpose into questions of genetic and physiological causation,
or phylogenetic history. But the Neo-Aristotelian argues that there is a purposive
‘‘cause,’’ or equivalently, a purposive ‘‘because…’’ built into representing anything
as living.1
One powerful reason to desire such a realist vindication of teleological language
is an uncontroversial fact that I alluded to earlier. Some products of evolution are
purposive and agential, namely ourselves and other ‘‘cognitively complex’’ animals.
It is a desideratum to understand how the teleological characteristics of psycho-
logically directed agency relate to the characteristics of biological life more
generally. The realist accounts of teleology surveyed here both support conceptions
of cognitively guided purposiveness as pre-figured by the characteristics of non-
cognitive life more generally, but in very different ways. If the organism really does
have an ultimate objective of reproduction, then we are in a position to speak not
only of what an organism does, but also of what it should do given that it has this
natural purpose. Both the Neo-Aristotelian and Darwinian realist positions can be
the source of the peculiar way in which distinctly normative ‘‘ought’’ claims can be
thought to arise out of an understanding of biology and evolution, and this is the
reason for some of the checkered history of evolutionary thought in realms of ethics
and political theory. The validity of all normative and evaluative judgments derived
from the conception of ‘‘fitness’’ in the behavioral sciences rests on a realist view of
1 Thanks to Micah Lott for this formulation.
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natural purpose. One motivation for denying realism, then, can come from the sense
that this sort of normative talk is value-laden and therefore unscientific and
metaphorical. Another can come from the side of normative ethical theory through
the judgment that the sorts of norms evolutionary biology might appear to entail are
not in line with our best moral reasoning. The Neo-Aristotelian views surveyed here
are also aimed at offering resources for a rapprochement between biology and
normative moral theory, but one that does not require thinking in terms of
reproductive success (Thompson 2008; Foot 2003; Lott 2012).The question of the
place and status of teleology in biology in general is foundational for understanding
the relationship between biology and normative ethical theory, and I hope to have
shown here a variety of different positions that might be relied upon in order to
address such questions.
Finally, I have offered considerations in favor of the Neo-Aristotelian position
that the question of whether or not and in what ways biological entities are
purposive is not an evolutionary question of their origins and how they change over
time. Nor does this question force us to first answer questions of how living things
arose from non-living matter in the first place. Indeed, only when we have decided
whether or not, and in what sense, organisms really are purposive does it make sense
to ask how natural purposes could have arisen out of non-purposive material
processes at all. Of course, the power of Darwinian theory is its usefulness in
conceiving and answering ‘‘origin’’ questions, and the general cumulative nature of
evolutionary change orients research into how any of the natural purposiveness we
observe arose in the first place. But the question of origins of life presupposes a
representation of what living things are and this is something that evolutionary
theory does not provide. Furthermore, just as evolutionary theory need not and
cannot give a purposive explanation of ‘‘why’’ organisms reproduce, it also cannot
give an ‘‘ultimate,’’ purposive explanation of ‘‘why’’ life evolved out of non-living
matter. These questions pertain to biological reality, but they are not the kinds of
questions that are tractable for evolutionary, or any other form of biological
explanation.
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